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Obstacles and Motivators for Partnership Formation in a
Multi-Dimensional Environment
Luke Fowler
School of Public Service
Boise State University
Abstract
Partnerships are now essential to public service delivery. However, due to limitations in
collaborative capacity, there are both obstacles and motivators for forming partnerships.
Intergovernmental and cross-sectoral partnerships offer different advantages and disadvantages
in extending public service missions in new directions. Using survey data of local air quality
agencies, findings determine different factors contribute to partnership and non-partnership.
Further findings suggest partnerships are driven largely by problem severity, but non-partnership
is driven by specific benefits and risks associated with types of partners. Conclusions indicate
that understanding non-partnership is a key to understanding partnership formation.
Keywords: collaboration, non-collaboration, intergovernmental partnership, public-private partnership, publicnonprofit partnership, local government, air quality, environmental policy
Introduction
Partnerships are an integral part of public service delivery, as policy implementation now requires cooperation
between levels of government and economic sectors to be successful. Extant research identifies several key factors in
making partnerships work, including issues related to inter-personal relations, network structures, institutional
arrangements, and measuring outcomes (Provan and Milward 2001; McQuaid 2010). However, according to Andrews
and Entwistle (2010), “scant attention has yet been paid to the key strategic questions of what kinds of organizations
are best to partner with” (p. 679). In the United States (U.S.), potential partners exist in a multi-dimensional
environment that includes both vertical and horizontal intergovernmental as well as cross-sectoral ties, with each type
of partner offering unique advantages and disadvantages by extending public service operations in new directions.
Notably, some organizations are better suited for partnerships than others, depending on goals and organizational
needs. Consequently, the calculus of partnership formation is complex, involving a balance of both potential benefits
and risks.
Given that public-sector organizations cannot reasonably collaborate with everyone, obstacles and motivators to
partnership formation exist. While some scholarship explores factors correlated with partnerships (Graddy and Chen
2006; Fowler 2018), there are fewer insights into organizational constraints that create obstacles to cooperative ties.
More specifically, extant research tends to focus on why partners form, but rarely consider why partnerships fail to
come to fruition. Furthermore, lack of partnership tends to be seen in a negative light (i.e., collaboration is the goal)
(Kettl 2006), but in some cases, partnerships can hinder organizational performance, especially if organizations are
not well-suited as partners and/or lack requisite capacities to manage shared problems (Longoria 2005; Hodge and
Greve 2007). Since not partnering occurs by default for most organizations, the barriers to collaboration can provide
important insights into why managers avoid partnerships or what factors contribute to a heightened perception of risks
involved. In other words, understanding why partnerships fail to form is an important piece of the puzzle of
understanding inter-organizational relationships during the modern era of governance.
In light of these issues, we examine how factors such as problem severity, available resources, equity, autonomy, and
competitiveness motivate or hinder inter-organizational ties with specific types of partners. In exploring partnership
motivators and obstacles, first, we review literature on partnerships in the public sector and compare multi-dimensional
types of partners. Then, we examine partnerships based on data from a sampling of local air agencies. Findings
indicate that local agencies partner or do not partner with types of organizations for different reasons, which is likely
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to their benefit as certain types of organizations represent more risk than reward. Results of a statistical analysis
indicate partnerships are driven primarily by problem severity, but non-partnerships are driven by specific benefits
and risks associated with types of partners. Finally, we offer conclusions on partnership and non-partnership.
Cooperation Complexities
Understanding when cooperation occurs is a long-standing pursuit of academics across many disciplines, including
public policy and administration, political science, economics, and even biology, with Ostrom’s (2015) work on
governing common pool resources as an illustration of its interdisciplinary importance (Axelrod 2006). However, few
comprehensive answers are available, other than cooperation “occurs when the pursuit of self-interest by each leads
to a poor outcome for all” (Axelrod 2006, p. 7). In particular, public-sector organizations may be limited in addressing
some complex policy problems but share goals with organizations from other jurisdictions and/or economic sectors.
To that end, public administration network scholarship focuses heavily on how inter-organizational ties (i.e.,
connections between organizations) that deviate from bureaucracies or markets can facilitate collective action when
single organizations cannot achieve policy goals (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Koliba, Mills, and Zia 2011; O’Toole
2015). Additionally, contemporary theoretical frameworks for policy implementation and public-service delivery are
grounded in network theory and include inter-organizational ties, cooperative behavior, government and nongovernmental actors, and assumptions that do not apply to conventional hierarchical, bureaucratic, or market
arrangements (Provan and Milward 2001; Lundin 2007; Hill and Hupe 2014; O’Toole 2015; Fowler 2018).
As such, cooperative ties are an important factor in program success and take on many different forms, ranging from
service contracts to “joining up” public service delivery (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). While we do not draw these
distinctions, there is some scholarship that disambiguates cooperation, collaboration, and partnerships by identifying
collaboration as a higher-order form of collective action compared to cooperation as a lower-order form and
partnerships as formalized agreements (Thomson and Perry 2006). Others argue differences depend on organizational
integration, which ranges from contracting out and government-driven goal specification to partnering and joint
platforms for defining goals (Teisman and Klijn 2002). Common points of comparison in this scholarship center on
purposes related to shared policy goals, with different partnership forms offering both advantages and disadvantages
based on strategic focus, missions, resources, and capacities (McQuaid 2010). Although some typologies capture
nuances of multi-dimensional ties, there are few comprehensive comparisons of partnerships relative to organizational
types (Johnson 2014; Morris and Miller-Stevens 2015).
Furthermore, current scholarship only tends to focus on organizations already collaborating with others, and not those
organizations that have failed to form such inter-organizational ties. A key component of this is that measuring and
evaluating partnerships is not an easy task. Their practical and informal nature creates many methodological barriers
for identification and comparison across diverse organizations functioning in unique contexts (Hodge and Greve 2007;
Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, and Rethemeyer 2011; O’Toole 2015). By extension, examining partnership that do
not come to fruition is an even more difficult task. Consequently, there is a dearth of scholarship explaining why noncooperation persists. As scholarship frames collaboration and partnership as a managerial tool to overcome complex
policy problems in the face of limited organizational capacities, there is only limited consideration of non-cooperation
as a managerial tool as well. More specifically, managers may also be using non-cooperation to maintain
organizational autonomy, avoid risk, or minimize transaction costs in service delivery (Provan and Milward 2001;
Agranoff 2006; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). As such, examining non-cooperation can provide important insights
into why partnerships fail to form even when need and opportunity exist (Fowler 2018).
Complex Partnership Choices
There are two interrelated sides to partnership formation: why they occur and why they do not occur. Partnership
requires some form of active engagement in collaboration or cooperation, and consequently, requires active choices
to engage other organizations (i.e., organizations do not end up in partnerships by default) (Thomson and Perry 2006).
On the other hand, non-partnership can be either active where managers purposefully do not engage other
organizations, or passive (i.e., occur by default) where managers simply do not pursue engagement. Since scholarship
normally assumes that partnership does not occur without specific catalysts and non-partnership is a default with no
specific explanation, it focuses heavily on the former with little or no investigation of the latter. Nevertheless, both
components are important in understanding what mechanisms reinforce default positions of non-partnerships or create
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specific catalyst for change that leads to partnership formation. In other words, if partnership formation is a function
of both passive and active action, then explanations that account for non-partnering can also explain why collaboration
do not come to fruition.
Both active and passive mechanisms surrounding partnership and non-partnership maybe proactive or reactive and
are responsive to both internal and external organizational stresses, where managers weigh risks and rewards
associated with specific partnership opportunities (Grady and Chen 2006; Fowler 2018). In most cases, nonpartnership is both the starting position and the far more likely ending position, because it does not require action.
Furthermore, partnership requires motivations for joint action, while non-partnership can occur in spite of motivation
to joint action if sufficient obstacles exist. While theoretically (and for analytical purposes) these constructs can be
separated, in practice they likely occur concurrently, where managers must decide to challenge existing status quos
(i.e., non-partnering) and to adopt a new status quo (i.e., partnering). Reversion to non-partnership is a potential
outcome in either stage. Additionally, following a shift from non-partnering to partnering, managers must also
consider levels of integration specific partnerships might involve (i.e., simple coordination or full operational
integration). As such, partnership formation is a multi-stage process that is difficult to separate in practice.
Nevertheless, scholarship tends to focus only on latter stages of that process, so creating an analytical separation allows
for a more nuanced analysis.
Motivations and Obstacles
Previous scholarship suggests that public-sector organizations partner for two reasons: internal pressures and external
opportunities. Obtaining resources to support internal programmatic needs or shared policy goals are the most
commonly identified internal motivations for partnerships (Fowler 2018). Organizations will collaborate with others
sharing a policy goal if they believe they can gain resources (either tangible or intangible) in the process (Graddy and
Chen 2006; Lee, Lee, and Feiock 2012; Provan and Huang 2012; Park and Rethemeyer 2014; Fowler 2018).
Commitments to goals, inter-organizational trust, problem severity, managerial capacity, organizational structure, and
risk assessment are also important factors in willingness to cooperate with other organizations (Andrew 2009; Feiock,
Lee, Park, and Lee 2010; McGuire and Silvia 2010; Bunger 2013; Fowler 2018). On the other hand, new organizations
also consider external factors when entering a network such as network structure, size, scope, and experience; potential
for partnerships; mandated inter-organizational ties or responsibilities; and perceived costs and benefits (O’Toole
1997, 2015; Graddy and Chen 2006; Fowler 2018). However, partnerships must form a balance that creates interorganizational ties but also allows for individual autonomy (Graddy and Chen 2006; Fischer, Ingold, Sciarini and
Varone 2012; Lee, et al. 2012; O’Toole 2015; Fowler 2018).
Additionally, partnership formation faces many obstacles, and non-partnership is the default in most cases. Actors
are constrained by their capacity to understand associated costs and benefits, forcing decisions with imperfect
information (Smith and Larimer 2009). Exacerbated by the growing number of organizations providing public
services since the 1980s, actors lack capacity to effectively consider or participate in partnerships with the myriad of
potential organizations available (Hill and Hupe 2014). Moreover, there is an economy of scale to networks, where
coordination costs eventually overburden transactions, reduce network effectiveness, and lead to collaborative inertia
(Provan and Milward 2001; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). Additionally, networks face
“operational, performance, or legal barriers that prevent the next action step… [and] face challenges in converting
solutions into policy energy, assessing internal effectiveness, surmounting the inevitable process blockages, mission
drift, and so on” (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, p. 265). Thus, organizations must limit their partners to an elite few,
based on their unique situation.
Multi-Dimensional Partners
In forming partnerships, managers are aware of both internal organizational needs and external opportunities and
threats (Graddy and Chen 2016; Fowler 2018). As such, they seek to maximize benefits and minimize risks of
partnership by matching with an organization with the highest capacity to fulfill their needs without creating an undue
threat to organizational goals. While there is significant research through different theoretical frameworks on benefits
of partnerships that indicate notable differences across organizational dimensions, scholarship is limited in integrating
these findings to account for how organizational types fit different needs (Andrews and Entwistle 2010; Walker and
Andrews 2013). To assess advantages and disadvantages offered by both intergovernmental and cross-sectoral
partners, table 1 compares types of potential partner based on benefits via extending scopes of operations into new
geographic, legal, or economic jurisdictions, and inherent risks associated with pre-existing institutional arrangements.
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Intergovernmental and cross-sectoral partnership both come in two forms: vertical (i.e., partners at different levels)
and horizontal (i.e., partners at the same level); and, public-nonprofit and public-private. Intergovernmental
partnerships increase effectiveness through an extension of operations into comprehensive or comparative
jurisdictions, while cross-sectoral partnerships increase equity and/or efficiency by extending operations into either
markets or areas of market failure. On the other hand, intergovernmental partnerships face barriers related to
conscription of lower-level governments by higher-level governments and replacing competition with cooperation,
while cross-sectoral partnerships suffer from principal-agent problems. Consequently, types of partners are not
interchangeable and compatibility with public-sector organizations depends largely on specific environments in which
they operate.
[Table 1 about here]
Intergovernmental Partnerships
Intergovernmental (public-public) are the most common form of public-sector partnership. Many public-sector
organizations have fragmented authorities created by divisions in geographic and legal jurisdictions (Feiock and
Scholtz 2009). As it is difficult for a single organization to effectively address a problem that is only partially within
its jurisdiction, intergovernmental partnerships extend operations into new jurisdictions which better match complex
problems (Thurmaier and Wood 2002; Raab and Milward 2003; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). As such, some federal
programs mandate intergovernmental ties and require federal, state, and/or local agencies to work together on complex
problems, which creates further complication in network management (O’Toole 1997). Nevertheless, expansion
brings economies of scale and coordinated institutional arrangements, leading to more effective outcomes (Thurmaier
and Wood 2002; Keast et al. 2004; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). Managers with severe policy problems or
prohibitive performance demands are likely to reach out to other public agencies dealing with the same or similar
issues in order to “join up” operations, and increase resources or capacity for managing a complex problem.
Consequently, if public-sector organizations effectively achieve their missions, intergovernmental partnerships are
unnecessary, but if they are ineffective or problems are severe, then there is motivation for collaboration with other
public-sector organizations.
More specifically, vertical intergovernmental partnerships extend operations to include a more comprehensive
institutional approach, presenting a large increase in operational scope. For example, in the U.S., State Rural
Development Councils and the National Rural Development Partnership create a forum for all levels of government
to collaborate for rural development, bringing in resources, expertise, and economic development networks that would
otherwise be unavailable to rural local governments (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). However, with vertical
partnerships, there is risk of power asymmetries that lead to conscription of lower-level partners into service by higherlevel partners, making them less like partnerships and more like hierarchies, especially when relationships are
mandated (Scicchitano and Hedge 1993; Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Zimmerman 2009). For example, although the
U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is ostensibly a federal-state partnership, federal agencies use
statutory language, resources, compliance reporting, and sanctions to partially preempt state authority in the program
(Scicchitano and Hedge 1993). Therefore, managers concerned that they would effectively become compliance
managers because of partnership with federal (or state) agencies are likely to find alternative organizations to work
with in order to preserve their autonomy, or not fully invest in these ties, even if mandated. Even though vertical
partnerships increase effectiveness and reduce problem severity by creating a more comprehensive institutional
approach to interjurisdictional problems, there is risk of losing autonomy. As such, loss of autonomy serves as a
barrier to these partnerships, leading to non-partnership by default.
On the other hand, horizontal intergovernmental partners expand operations into comparative jurisdictions, with
complementary missions, adjacent jurisdictions, or shared goals (Ling 2002; Warner and Bel 2008). These
partnerships offer similar benefits of effectiveness as vertical partnerships, but at a smaller scale (Warner and Bel
2008). One of the most common examples is regional economic development, where collective resources are used to
recruit new industries to an area benefiting all neighboring communities via spill-over effects (Gordon, 2007; Feiock,
Steinacker, and Park 2009). However, it is difficult to replace competition with cooperation, due to institutional
barriers, cultural norms, bargaining dynamics, and trust (Gordon, 2007; Feiock and Scholtz 2009; Kwon and Feiock
2010). For example, Gordon (2007) reports a culture of competition within regional economic development networks,
where partners supposedly work together but also tend to revert to “game playing” and use tools such as zoning to
affect site selection of specific projects recruited to a region through a cooperative effort. In general, when benefit
sharing becomes inequitable between inter-local partners, they stop complying and devolve to competitive or self-
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interested behavior, resulting in a relationship breakdown (Bennett and Howe 1998; Chen and Thurmaier 2009).
Consequently, local managers who do not trust other local agencies to cooperate faithfully are likely to avoid investing
resources into a partnership agreement that they think will eventually collapse. Thus, horizontal partnerships offer
effectiveness through expansion to comparative jurisdictions, but do not replace inter-local competition.
Subsequently, potential for failed cooperation and lack of trust can outweigh benefits of horizontal partnerships,
leading to non-partnership.
Cross-Sectoral Partnerships
Cross-sectoral partnerships expand public service missions into new economic segments that would otherwise be
difficult to access for public-sector organizations. In particular, public-nonprofit partnerships have expanded in recent
decades, as public sector limitations in serving underserved populations became more apparent (Alexander and Nank
2009). Nonprofits address market failures by filling gaps between public- and private-sectors via representing
traditionally disadvantaged, excluded, or underrepresented groups (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). Without
jurisdictional, political, and/or economic constraints that hamper public-sector organizations, nonprofits have a unique
capacity to create equity and fairness by connecting with populations and problems that do not readily fit into
conventional public-sector missions (Weisbrod 1997; Wallis and Dollery 2006; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). For
example, West Harlem Environmental Action (WE ACT) in New York partnered with other local environmental
health groups and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to raise public awareness of pollutant health
impacts among local minority communities, which ultimately lead to better health outcomes for a vulnerable
population (Minkler, Vasquez, Tajik, and Petersen 2008). As such, managers with pressure (via community leaders
or elected officials) to serve minority populations but without adequate capacity to do so are likely to seek out
nonprofits as a means to expand their operations without stressing existing resources. As such, nonprofits attract
public-sector partners in need of expanding services to under-privileged populations, but public-sector organizations
not struggling with servicing those populations have little interest.
On the other hand, private-sector organizations “are better at performing economics tasks, innovating, replicating
successful experiments, adapting to rapid change, abandoning unsuccessful or obsolete activities and performing
complex or technical tasks” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, p. 45-46). With extra-governmental resources and increased
pressure for efficiency, private partners provide access to marketplace benefits, such as funds, expertise, flexibility,
and shared risk (Cohen and Eimicke 2008; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). The most common examples are contracting
out public services to private companies, such as a private firm collecting garbage under an agreement with a local
government, where cost-savings result from increased operational flexibility and/or competition between private
firms. Other forms include cooperation for joint production and risk sharing, long-term infrastructure development
projects, policy networks, and community development (Hodge and Greve 2007). Managers with increased
performance and financial demands from elected officials are likely to seek out partners that can offer access to extragovernmental resources and with more flexibility to provide services at reduced costs in order to improve performance
without additional public resources. As such, public-private partnerships offer attractive benefits for public-sector
organizations struggling with delivering services with limited resources.
Nevertheless, cross-sectoral partnerships suffer from classic principal-agent problems, where information
asymmetries, goal incongruity, and mission differences lead to conflict. For example, private prisons produce
operational cost-saving, but typically at the expense of prisoner well-being. As such, there is significant scrutiny of
contracts that might provide public services below expected quality (Bedard and Frech 2009). Successes and failures
of cross-sectoral partnerships tend to be explained by organizational capacities for managing incompatibilities and
holding partners accountable (Skelcher 2005; Gazley and Brudney 2007; Hodge and Greve 2007; Acar, Guo, and
Yang 2008). Managers wary of program or resource misuse or attracting heightened scrutiny from stakeholders
concerned about conflicts of interest are likely to be unwilling to engage cross-sectoral partners. In sum, cross-sectoral
partnerships offer equity and efficiency, respectively, but come with principal-agent problems.
Managing Air Quality
In the U.S., the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 (amended in 1977 and 1990) relies on a federal-state partnership: EPA
sets ambient air quality standards and provides oversight of state programs; and, states develop implementation plans
(Belden 2001; Fowler 2016, 2018). Within this context, local air quality offers an adept case to examine partnership
formation for several reasons. First, although hierarchical components exist, previous research argues CAA
implementation functions more as a network with fluidity in membership and organizations mostly controlling their
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own engagement (Fowler 2018). Second, local responsibilities fluctuate between states, with some local governments
operating as administrative sub-units of states, some having complete independence, and others having no role at all
(Lester and Lombard 1998; Woods and Potoski 2010; Fowler 2016, 2018). However, due to limited jurisdictions,
most local governments need to collaborate in order to affect air quality (Fowler 2016).
Third, competitive pressures have led to policy innovation at state and local-levels, which have included both new
pollution control strategies and collaborative efforts (Woods and Potoski 2010; Fowler 2018). While federal
regulations primarily focus on technology-forcing provisions for stationary (e.g., industrial sites) and mobile (e.g.,
cars) sources of air pollutants, state and local policies are more diverse and rely on different strategies (e.g., smart
growth and energy planning) that align with local policy contexts. Fourth, there is a regional component created by
Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs), which tend to align with metropolitan areas (Belden 2001; Fowler 2016).
Since pollutants transect jurisdictional boundaries and drift across geographic areas, this presents a ripe context for
potential partnerships to form across jurisdictions. Finally, scholarship identifies several key factors for environmental
policy that also impact collaborations, such as program effectiveness, problem severity, resource available, equity
(i.e., environmental justice), and intergovernmental relations (Vig and Kraft 2016).
In practice, governing legislation and the nature of air quality encourages intergovernmental partnerships. For local
governments, partnering directly with state and federal agencies typically means serving as a local arm of their
implementation schemes (Lester and Lombard 1998; Woods and Potoski 2010; Fowler 2016, 2018). This provides
additional access to resources, but severely limits autonomy and innovation capacity (Fowler 2018). However, state
and federal air quality missions tend to be limited to area specific attainment of the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), and not universally improving air quality. Therefore, local areas not threatened with nonattainment get limited attention and resources from vertical intergovernmental partners. On the other hand, horizontal
partnerships provide an opportunity “to coordinate projects and initiatives across regions and sectors to expand the
impact of projects that would otherwise be too limited in scale to a have a substantive impact” (Fowler 2016, p. 184).
Local governments surveyed for this study reported intergovernmental partners included environmental protection,
transportation, and health agencies at local, state, and federal levels.
Additionally, both nonprofit and private organizations also engage in cooperative ties for air quality. These crosssectoral partnerships expand local air quality initiatives to include primary producers of emissions and community
advocates. For nonprofits, these roles include advocacy or outreach campaigns and consulting with businesses or
public sector agencies. On the other hand, private organizations, as primary producers of air pollution, work with
public and nonprofit organizations locally to reduce their emissions (NAC 2017; NALGEP 2017). However, these
partnerships also have potential for conflicting missions, as environmental policy can be highly contentious (Vig and
Kraft 2016). Reported nonprofit partners included environmental protection, health, and sustainability focused
advocacy groups, while reported private partners included local business, utilities, and trade associations.
Methods
Data
We collected data via survey of local government members of the National Association of Clean Air Agencies
(NACAA), which is the common listing of local air agencies used in previous scholarship (Woods and Potoski 2010;
Fowler 2016, 2018). We contacted the 118 local-level members of NACAA’s online membership directory three
times via mail and email (NACAA 2017). Of 81 total respondents (68.6% of total sample), 72 (61.0%) completed
enough of the survey to be usable here, with 26 (32.1% of respondents) responding via mail and 55 (67.9%) digitally.
Surveys were identical in question wording and fixed order, and exploratory data analyses indicate no differences
between mail and digital responses. Additionally, respondents are both diverse and representative of NACAA
membership regionally and institutionally. We found no systematic differences between survey respondent
characteristics and average characteristics of all agencies or between respondents and non-respondents, suggesting the
data sample is representative of local air agencies. However, local air agencies do not exist in 24 states as a result of
both state- and local-level socio-political, economic, and environmental factors (Woods and Potoski 2010; Fowler
2018), which may create systematic differences between states with and without local air agencies. As such, this may
create limitations in generalizing to local agencies with different missions; although, we do not believe our data is
biased in generalizations to local air agencies specifically.
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We formulated survey questions to identify differences in cooperative or partnership relationships with broad
categories of organizations that interact with local air agencies. Our two primary interests along these lines were
which types of organizations local air agencies choose to work with and which types of organizations local air agencies
avoid. To this end, we designed survey questions using Likert-scale responses to create a point of comparison between
agencies along those two dimensions. However, we purposely avoided asking questions that project an ideal type of
partnership functions in order to allow flexibility from respondents in evaluating their relationships with other
organizations. Consequently, we did not ask questions about specific types or structures of activities. Although
relying on respondent perceptions creates a limitation to our analysis, it also allows respondents to take into
consideration the circumstances of their inter-organizational relationships when responding, which we believe
captures a broader cross-section of cooperative behaviors.
Dependent Variables
We modeled dependent variables as ordinal dummy variables of local air agency managerial perceptions of
partnerships with other types of organizations. We measured partnership with two constructs (partnership vs. nonpartnership) for five types of partners (other local, state, federal, nonprofit, and private). Partnership measures active
cooperation with another organization of a specific type, while non-partnership measures not engaging with all
potential partners available within a category. This allows for separate analyses of two interrelated constructs: 1)
partnership formation based on actively engaging another organization of a particular type; and 2) either actively or
passively not engaging broad categories of potential partners. While interrelated as part of the same process,
partnership and non-partnership are distinct constructs, and not simply inverses. Partnership accounts for potential
benefits offered by a specific organization, while non-partnership accounts for broad risks associated with
organizations of a certain type. This distinction is important in delineating factors that motivate partnership versus
factors that create obstacles to partnership by leading to non-partnership (i.e., what factors contribute to one versus
factors that contribute to the other).
While improving air quality is the focus of most partnerships, they may form for different political and/or
administrative reasons. Additionally, partnerships may take on different forms, as collaborative arrangements are not
interchangeable when working with a diverse set of partners with different jurisdictions, authorities, and missions.
For instance, contracting may be more likely with private organizations, while inter-local agreements for service
provision may be more likely with other local agencies. If we assume these partnerships serve similar purposes
though, we can also assume the same predictors influence them. That is, when considering forming a partnership,
managers likely consider both forms needed and forms available.
Survey respondents rated constructs for each type of partner in their perceived area on a Likert scale from strongly
disagree (one) to strongly agree (five). Table 2 summarizes measurement of partnership constructs and types of
partners. For partnership, respondents rated state and local agencies highest with 92% and 90%, and nonprofit and
private organizations lowest with 63% and 43%, respectively, responding strongly or somewhat agree. Conversely,
for non-partnership, respondents rated nonprofit and private organizations highest with 19% and 13%, and state and
local agencies lowest with 11% and 11%, respectively. While respondents favored partnership over non-partnership,
that skew is more prominent for intergovernmental compared to cross-sectoral partnerships. Additionally, bi-variate
correlation analysis indicates that inter-construct relationships are negative across all partner types, and intra-construct
relationships are positive across all partner types.1 This suggests that partnering is distinct from non-partnering and
both are distinct across intergovernmental and cross-sectoral dimensions, which supports separating partnership and
non-partnership into two constructs. For ordinal probit models, we reorganized intergovernmental partners into three
variables to better align with the comparative framework presented above: 1) combined intergovernmental (average
of local, state, federal); 2) vertical intergovernmental (average of state and federal); and 3) horizontal
intergovernmental (local). Appendix A summarizes descriptive statistics for variables.
[Table 2 about here]
Predictor Variables
We used six predictor variables to account for differences in benefits and risks related to each type of partner, and
control for agency type.2 First, we use problem severity, local autonomy, and local competition as predictors of
intergovernmental partnerships. Since effectiveness of a single agency’s efforts in a collective action scenario are
difficult to determine, we measure problem severity instead as annual median air quality index (AQI). AQI creates a
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standardized measure of air quality on a scale from 0 to 500, across six regulated criteria pollutants and AQCRs (EPA
2018b). Existing air quality conditions serve as the best measure of severity of policy problems faced by air agencies.
If air quality is not a severe problem (i.e., low AQI), then agencies likely find little utility in partnering with other
public-agencies. However, if air quality is a severe problem, then local agencies should be motivated to partner with
other public agencies in order to better manage a problem across a regional area and reduce local problem severity.
Intergovernmental partnership should increase and non-partnership decrease as AQI increases (i.e., problem severity
increases).
Pre-existing state-local relations create a context for local risks at conscription by higher-level vertical partners. While
there are several methods to capture differences in state-local relations, the Dillon’s Rule versus Home Rule
comparison is one of the most parsimonious. In Dillon’s Rule states, local governments have narrow autonomy to
partake only in activities authorized by states. On the other hand, in Home Rule states, local governments have broad
autonomy and delegated powers from states (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001; NLC 2017). If local governments have
broad autonomy, then forming partnerships with vertical partners creates a risk of lost autonomy. However, if local
governments have narrow autonomy, then there is little risk in vertical partnerships, as they essentially have nothing
to lose. We measure risks to local autonomy as Dillon’s Rule versus Home Rule. Currently, 31 states apply Dillon’s
Rule; 10 states, Home Rule; and, 9 states, a modified version of Dillon’s Rule (NLC 2017). We created an ordinal
dummy variable with categories ordered as: Dillon’s Rule (0), limited or modified Dillon’s Rule (1), and Home Rule
(2). Vertical intergovernmental partnership should increase and non-partnership decrease as local government
autonomy decreases (i.e., Dillon’s Rule).
Previous findings on inter-local competition indicate that larger cities act more independently in policy innovation,
due to decrease competitive pressure. Additionally, smaller cities have less capacity and resources to compete with
larger cities in their area (Walker 2006; Shipan and Volden 2005, 2008; Fowler 2016). Thus, comparative jurisdiction
size reflects perceived threats of competition from horizontal partners. If local governments are relatively small, then
they are likely less willing to risk investing in a cooperative relationship that may revert to competition. However, if
local governments are relatively large, then forming horizontal partnerships is a low risk proposal. We measure risks
of local competition as portion of metropolitan area population under agency jurisdiction (Shipan and Volden 2005;
Fowler 2018). Horizontal partnership should increase and non-partnership decrease as risk of competition decreases
(i.e., agency jurisdiction increases).
Second, we use local socio-economic equity and available resources as predicators of cross-sectoral partnerships.
Previous research indicates environmental justice is a pervasive issue in urban areas, with traditionally disenfranchised
groups, such as low-income individuals, having a higher probability of exposure to pollutants (Harper, et al. 2013).
While issues of environmental inequality are widespread and well-documented, there are few generalizable measures
available at the local-level. Nevertheless, some scholarship indicates local economic inequality is a surrogate for
potential environmental inequity (Harper, et al. 2013). Additionally, areas with high economic inequality are more
likely to have capacity for public-nonprofit partnerships, with more non-profits and an institutional culture supporting
these arrangements (Gronbjerg and Paarlberg 2001). If local areas have high economic inequality, then forming
partnerships with non-profit organizations creates significant potential benefits by offering expanded services to
under-privileged populations. However, if areas have low economic inequality, then there is little potential benefit in
forming public-nonprofit partnerships. We measure local socio-economic equity as ratio of median household income
in the 20th percentile to the 80th percentile for each MSA or µSA. Public-nonprofit partnership should increase and
non-partnership decrease as inequity increases (i.e., inequity ratios increase).
Since efficiency is a rate of both resources expended and change in outcomes over time, a cross-sectional research
design cannot effectively capture efficiency in the most conventional sense. However, in a more practical way,
available financial resources compared to problem severity can also serve as a measure of resource pressure, where
we consider expenditure availability and problem severity together. While this approach creates both theoretical and
methodological limitations, it does provide meaningful measurement of resource pressures, and is testable with
available data. As such, if available resources are high and air quality is not a problem, then there is little to gain from
public-private partnerships. However, if available resources are low in comparison to problem severity, then local
agencies would be motivated to partner with private organizations in order to gain access to extra-governmental
resources or improve their use of resources related to problem severity.
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We measured available resources as per capita spending rate per AQI point, capturing both ratio of spending inputs to
problem severity and comparative resources between agencies. However, as a higher AQI means higher problem
severity (i.e., more pollutants), AQI is inverted by subtracting it from 100 (maximum allowable for NAAQS
attainment) before dividing it by per capita spending rate.3 This creates a comparable measure that reflects amount of
spending per iteration of problem severity. While we collected spending data via survey, self-reported budget data
may suffer from errors. As budgets of local government in the data sample are not all organized around specific
programs, this serves as the best approximation available though. Public-private partnership should increase and nonpartnership decrease as available resources decrease (i.e., spending per air improvement iteration increases).
Finally, we control for agency types with a dummy variable comparing regional agencies to city and/or county
agencies (base category). These represent distinct types of government agencies with different ties to other public
agencies, authorities, and jurisdictions. Additionally, previous research indicates a different set of pressures affect
regional planning agencies when joining networks compared to municipalities (Fowler 2018). With more institutional
autonomy and capacity, regional planning agencies should be less likely to partner and more likely to non-partner,
compared to city and county agencies. Given the numerous variables, we summarize expected directional
relationships for predictors of partnership and non-partnership in table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
Analysis
We use ordinal probit models to assess predictors of partnership and non-partnership, with coefficients reported.
Additionally, we corrected for heteroscedasticity with robust standard errors (Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins 2001;
Mendard 2002; Shelley 2008). Further diagnostics indicate no other issues. Although the full dataset includes 72
observations, ordinal probit models include 63 or 64 observations due to missing data. To address causation issues
and account for lag in partnership formation, predictor variables are observed for 2013 and dependent variables
measured by survey in 2016.4
Results
Table 4 presents results of ordinal probit models for partnership, and table 5, for non-partnership. Additionally, given
the numerous findings presented, table 6 summarizes the statistically significant results. First, problem severity is the
primary driver of partnership across all types of partners. As air quality worsens, partnership with every type of
organization increases. These findings are consistent with predictions concerning intergovernmental partnership
formation. While findings for local competition and autonomy support predictions for combined intergovernmental,
they are not consistent with predictions for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental specifically. Additionally, other
variables had significant relationships that we did not predict. Most importantly, available resources is a significant
predictor of combined, vertical, and horizontal intergovernmental, where increased available resources leads to
decreased partnership. For cross-sectoral partners, problem severity is the only significant predictor of publicnonprofit and public-private partnership, and income inequality and available resources do not have significant
relationships.
[Tables 4, 5, & 6 about here}
Second, drivers of non-partnership are much more diverse across types of organizations than for partnership.
Interestingly, available resources appears to be a key source of non-partnership, as it demonstrates a significant,
consistent relationship with all types of partners. Findings for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental are consistent
with expectations, as increased autonomy and decreased competition lead to increased non-partnership, respectively.
Additionally, local competition also proved to be a significant predictor of combined and vertical intergovernmental,
where increased competition leads to decreased non-partnership. For cross-sectoral partners, findings are consistent
with predictions, as decreases in income inequality and increases in available resources lead to increased nonpartnership with non-profit and private, respectively. Finally, regional agencies are more likely to non-partner with
private and non-profit organizations than municipal governments, which is likely a result of their larger authority and
jurisdictions. However, certain findings for both partnership and non-partnership were only significant below 0.1
probability level, so these findings may be less reliable than others presented here. Additionally, while public-
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nonprofit and public-private were statistically significant below 0.05 probably level, combined, vertical, and
horizontal intergovernmental models were also only significant below 0.1 probability level. McFadden’s Pseudo-R2
statistics indicate models are moderately strong predictors of both partnership and non-partnership.
Limitations
A few notable limitations to these findings warrant discussion. First, data and findings are likely only generalizable
to a specific group of agencies. Air quality is a unique policy area that addresses a complex problem and relies on
“top-down” elements institutionalized by the CAA, making it significantly different from some other public goods
and services. As such, air quality is reliant much more on intergovernmental partnerships than cross-sectoral
partnerships, which decreases likelihood of public-private or public-nonprofit partnerships. Second, while predictor
variables correlate to at least one dependent variable and vice versa, these measures do not take into account how
specific agencies may measure concepts like available resource, or how they perceive risks of competition or to their
autonomy. Furthermore, analyses do not isolate effects of specific forms of partnership (e.g., contracting), which
limits insights into how different forms develop. As policy characteristics, performance metrics, and partnership
forms can affect cooperation, these findings may not be wholly applicable to other policy areas that vary in complexity,
rely on different cooperative strategies, include less rigid governing legislation, or involve more cross-sectoral than
intergovernmental partnerships.
Third, both partnership and non-partnership require at least some amount of interpretation from respondents, which
creates possibilities that respondents may interpret the same item differently. There were several assumptions made
in designing survey items that led to leaving items ambiguous though: partnership intensity varies between
organizational categories, forms, and agency cultures (i.e., weak partnerships for some may be substantive to others);
collaborative arrangements are not interchangeable when working with a diverse set of partners (i.e., contracting is
more likely for public-private partnerships, while service agreements more likely for inter-local partnerships); and,
partner availability fluctuates across geographic areas (i.e., organizations working on air quality in one AQCR may
not be doing so in other AQCRs). However, there is also an assumption that as members of a national association of
similar agencies (i.e., NACAA), respondents have knowledge of partnership norms in air quality, and considered those
when responding. That is, respondents have some objective bar at which to measure themselves that takes into account
complex contextual issues and creates a point of comparison across many agencies situated in different circumstances.
While relying on measures that are more concrete may create more face validity, it would assume that all local air
agencies have similar partnership options in practice. On the other hand, by relying on perceptions, analyses examine
perceived partnership and non-partnership, with individual interpretations potentially creating bias.
Fourth, theoretically, partnership and non-partnership are two separate stages of a multi-stage process that ranges from
a default position without partners to an actively chosen position of partnership. However, in practice, these stages
likely occur concurrently, which makes it difficult to separate concepts in partnership formation processes.
Methodologically, partnering and non-partnering are tested separately, but models do not account for how these
constructs link together in a process. As such, findings provide some insight into which factors contribute to
partnership and which to non-partnership, but are limited in identifying how partnership and non-partnership relate
to each other or how factors may simultaneously influence both. Finally, while survey data is representative of air
agencies and findings are statistically significant, small n-sizes leaves our analyses with limited statistical power.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest four notable conclusions. First, as cooperation with every potential partner with shared policy
goals is impractical, non-partnership is an important tool for not over-extending cooperative capacity (McGuire and
Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). For local air agencies, there are factors correlated with both partnership
and non-partnership. However, previous scholarship almost exclusively focuses on the former, and makes little or no
investigation of the latter. The calculus of partnership formation is more complex than this though, where partnerships
are a function of both potential benefits and risks. As such, understanding non-partnership may provide insights into
scenarios where partnerships do not form between mismatched organizations even when need and opportunity exist.
For managers, these findings suggest that non-partnership is another managerial tool for steering public-sector
agencies towards their goals, where avoiding poorly suited partners may be as important as attracting well-matched
partners.
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Second, two different sets of factors drive partnership and non-partnership, which include both shared goals and risks
associated with specific types of organizations, respectively. Findings for partnership largely correspond with existing
arguments that partnerships form around shared problems or goals. More specifically, problem severity is a chief
motivator regardless of partner type, suggesting need to improve policy outcomes is a major driver of partnerships.
This is particularly notable for ties to private and nonprofit organizations, where air quality is the only significant
predictor of partnership. Nevertheless, other factors (i.e., available resources) affect intergovernmental partnership,
which is consistent with scholarship on improving efficiency through economies of scale (Andrews and Entwistle
2010). However, findings on non-partnership suggests that advantages and disadvantages offered by different types
of organizations are a primary obstacle to partnerships. In some cases, these factors may result in organizations not
actively pursuing partnerships, and in other cases, they may present an obstacle to pursuing partnerships. More
specifically, non-partnership is affected by: problem severity with combined intergovernmental partners; local
autonomy with vertical partners; local competition with horizontal partners; income inequality with nonprofit partners;
and available resources with private partners. Additionally, available resources appears to affect more than one type
of partner. Thus, there are both motivators and obstacles for partnership, with motivators tied to problem severity and
obstacles to other competing interests.
Third, from a practical perspective, managers trying to form partnerships have to address two sets of concerns when
“selling” themselves as partners: 1) how will partnership improve policy outcomes; and 2) how big of a threat is an
organization as a partner. Despite an emphasis on cooperation and partnership in recent decades, partnerships can
potentially hinder organizational performance, especially if partners are ill-suited for the situation (Longoria 2005;
Hodge and Greve 2007). As such, managers must understand how partnership creates new opportunities or capacities
for managing a complex problem. If new capacities do not complement existing capacities, then it is likely that
partnership will create additional costs in organizing efforts without corresponding improvements in policy outcomes.
Furthermore, managers must also understand risks involved when partnering with other organizations. Investing time
and resources as well as constructing strategies relying on efforts from others creates an immense amount of risks for
public managers. Consequently, when risks outweigh benefits, non-partnership is likely a better choice than
partnership. However, by considering these issues early, managers can be better prepared for identifying benefits and
risks of potential partnerships, as well as communicating those benefits and risks to their partners in order to encourage
deeper consideration of these issues on all sides.
Fourth, different types of organizations offer different advantages and disadvantages for partnership (or nonpartnership). Findings suggest that all types of organizations offer an advantage for addressing problem severity.
However, there are specific organizations that are perceived as offering more advantages (or at least, less
disadvantages), related to issues such as available resources, income inequality, competition, or autonomy. While
previous scholarship examines some of these dimensions, there are few examples of an integrated framework for
comparing organizational types for purposes of partnership. As such, these findings provide additional insight into
how organizations compare to each other. In practice, these findings suggest that managers should consider multiple
organizational dimensions when analyzing potential partnerships, with advantages and disadvantages varying
significantly across intergovernmental and cross-sectoral levels.
Additional research should be undertaken to determine more specifically mechanisms by which partnership formation
occurs (or not) for public-sector organizations. Most importantly, there should be further examination of the multistage process that leads to partnership to provide further insights into which factors affect choices at different decisionpoints, and how separate stages are interrelated, overlapping, and/or intersecting. Additionally, as findings did not
strictly conform to expected theoretical relationships, future research is necessary to develop alternative frameworks
for comparison or apply the framework to other policy areas that may include operational differences that better align
with its theoretical underpinnings (Lundin 2007; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). Methodologically, future research
should employ other research designs, including qualitative approaches and large n-size quantitative studies, to garner
robust findings about these relationships. Understanding why non-partnerships persist is a key to further insights into
partnership formation and building effective collaborations with public-sector organizations and networks for public
service delivery.
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Notes
1.

Inter-construct relationships range from -.493 for federal to -.256 for local, while intra-construct
relationships range from .699 for state-federal non-partnership and .174 for local-nonprofit nonpartnership

2.

Correlations of predictor variables range from .472 to -.337. VIF statistics indicate no multicollinearity
exists in any models presented.

3.

We tested alternative versions of this variable, with results similar to those reported here. However,
statistical tests indicated the version used was the best fit for the data.

4.

While the largest single annual increase in federal spending on pollution control and abatement since
1977 occurred in 2010, spending returned to previous levels starting in 2013, which marked a contraction
in available resources for air quality programs that had expanded in the interim (Office of Management
and Budget 2017). If partnerships were partially motivated by resource-seeking, then air quality agencies
would be likely to adapt behaviors starting in 2013 in response to changes at the federal-level.
Additionally, we assume partnership formation is a multi-stage process that occurs over multiple years.
We tested lag variations with diagnostics indicating a three-year lag was the best fit for the data. As
such, we use 2013 observations to measure conditions that likely affect the partnership formation process
that unfolds over approximately three years and would yield stable partnerships by 2016.
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Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Types of Partners in a Multi-Dimensional Environment
Type of Partnership
Intergovernmental
-Vertical Intergovernmental
-Horizon Intergovernmental
Cross-sectoral
-Public-Nonprofit
-Public-Private

Operation Extension

Benefits
Effectiveness

Comprehensive
Comparative
Market failures
Market

Risks
Conscription
Competition
Principal-agent

Equity
Efficiency

Table 2. Measurement of Partners Constructs and Types of Partners
Constructs
1. Partnership: My office actively cooperates or
partners with [type of partner] working on air
quality issues in my area.
2. Non-Partnership: There are [type of partner]
working on air quality issues in my area that my
office does not cooperate or partner with.

Types of Partners
1. Other local agencies

Responses
1. Strongly Disagree

2. State agencies

2. Somewhat Disagree

3. Federal agencies

3. Neutral

4. Nonprofit
organizations

4. Somewhat Agree

5. Private organizations
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Table 3. Summary of Expected Directional Relationships
Problem
severity
Partnership
Combined Intergov’t
Vertical Intergov’t
Horizontal Intergov’t
Public-Nonprofit
Public-Private
Non-Partnership
Combined Intergov’t
Vertical Intergov’t
Horizontal Intergov’t
Public-Nonprofit
Public-Private

Income
inequality

Available
resources

+
+
+

Local
competition

Local
autonomy

+
+
-

-

+
+

Regional
agency
+
+
+
+
+

Table 4. Ordinal Probit Results for Partnerships
Combined
Vertical
Horizontal
Intergov’t+
Intergov’t+
Intergov’t+
Problem severity
.031 (.013)*
.026 (.012)*
.028 (.017)+
Income inequality
-.106 (.362)
-.196 (.357)
.105 (.382)
Available resources
-.006 (.002)*
-.005 (.002)*
-.002 (.001)+
Local competition
.877 (.498)+
1.226 (.482)*
-.008 (.655)
Local autonomy
-.410 (.213)+
-.326 (.213)
-.283 (.215)
Regional agency
-.165 (.298)
-.359 (.326)
.446 (.372)
Cut Point 1
-.530 (2.110)
-.210 (1.813)
-.072 (2.216)
Cut Point 2
.570 (2.063)
.086 (1.823)
.659 (2.464)
Cut Point 3
.904 (2.061)
.633 (1.840)
1.024 (2.488)
Cut Point 4
1.365 (2.076)
1.271 (1.850)
2.416 (2.538)
Cut Point 5
1.725 (2.086)
Cut Point 6
2.227 (2.104)
McFadden’s Pseudo R2
.221
.193
.201
Log likelihood
-83.775
-62.095
-103.356
N
64
64
64
Note: +<.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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PublicNonprofit*
.026 (.012)*
.321 (.451)
-.001 (.002)
.285 (.610)
-.065 (.217)
-.104 (.369)
1.374 (2.245)
1.791 (2.387)
2.881 (2.485)
4.030 (2.539)
.155
-79.507
63

PublicPrivate*
.027 (.011)*
.031 (.349)
-.002 (.002)
.905 (.634)
.025 (.198)
-.472 (.383)
.335 (1.775)
.753 (1.797)
1.977 (1.828)
2.779 (1.839)
.174
-86.529
63
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Table 5. Ordinal Probit Results for Non-Partnerships
Combined
Vertical
Horizontal
Intergov’t+
Intergov’t+
Intergov’t+
Problem severity
-.022 (.011)*
-.023 (.012)+
-.016 (.012)
Income inequality
.124 (.344)
.026 (.349)
.193 (.402)
Available resources
.004 (.001)***
.003 (.001)*
.004 (.002)*
Local competition
-1.237 (.559)*
-1.306 (.613)*
-1.027 (.510)*
Local autonomy
.335 (.180)+
.417 (.178)*
.014 (.244)
Regional
.538 (.345)
.532 (.388)
.409 (.373)
Cut Point 1
-1.826 (1.815)
-2.312 (1.948)
-.032 (2.100)
Cut Point 2
-1.545 (1.781)
-2.092 (1.937)
.791 (2.119)
Cut Point 3
-1.284 (1.782)
-1.543 (1.942)
1.330 (2.112)
Cut Point 4
-.835 (1.784)
-1.331 (1.934)
Cut Point 5
-.572 (1.786)
-.408 (1.932)
Cut Point 6
-.084 (1.765)
-.121 (1.920)
Cut Point 7
.324 (1.764)
Cut Point 8
.798 (1.808)
.189
McFadden’s Pseudo R2
.184
.186
Log likelihood
-118.498
-96.850
-69.809
N
64
64
64
Note: +<.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.

PublicNonprofit*
.011 (.010)
-.735 (.357)*
.004 (.002)*
-.529 (.580)
.323 (.215)
.715 (.343)*
-4.489 (2.179)
-3.928 (2.142)
-2.700 (2.098)
-1.672 (2.065)
.209
-81.034
63

Public-Private*
-.008 (.009)
-.360 (.410)
.003 (.002)+
-.642 (.506)
.218 (.241)
.524 (.302)+
-3.393 (2.253)
-2.738 (2.224)
-1.438 (2.177)
-.510 (2.221)
.170
-80.888
63

Table 6. Summary of Statistically Significant Findings
Problem
severity
Partnership
Combined Intergov’t
Vertical Intergov’t
Horizontal Intergov’t
Public-Nonprofit
Public-Private
Non-Partnership
Combined Intergov’t
Vertical Intergov’t
Horizontal Intergov’t
Public-Nonprofit
Public-Private

Income
inequality

Available
resources

Local
competition

Local
autonomy

+
+
+
+
+

-

+
+

-

-

+
+
+
+
+

-

+
+

-
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Regional
agency

+
+
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Appendices
Appendix A. Variable Descriptive Statistics for Ordinal Probit Models
Variable

Description

Mean

Combined
intergovernmental
(partnership)
Vertical
intergovernmental
(partnership)
Horizontal
intergovernmental
(partnership)
Public-Nonprofit
(partnership)
Public-Private
(partnership)
Combined
intergovernmental
(non-partnership)
Vertical
intergovernmental
(non-partnership)
Horizontal
intergovernmental
(non-partnership)
Public-Nonprofit
(non-partnership)
Public-Private (nonpartnership)
Problem severity
Available resources

Average of Likert scale response to positive partnership
survey item for local, state, and federal agencies

Income inequality
Local competition
Local autonomy
Regional

Min

Max

4.37

Std.
Dev.
.63

3

5

Average of Likert scale response to positive partnership
survey item for state and federal agencies

4.39

.70

3

4

Likert scale response to positive partnership survey item for
local agencies

4.33

.89

1

5

Likert scale response to positive partnership survey item for
nonprofit organizations
Likert scale response to positive partnership survey item for
private organizations
Average of Likert scale response to negative partnership
survey item for local, state, and federal agencies

3.79

.99

1

5

3.40

1.13

1

5

1.86

.84

1

4

Average of Likert scale response to negative partnership
survey item for state and federal agencies

1.91

.95

1

4

Likert scale response to negative partnership survey item for
local agencies

1.77

.99

1

4

Likert scale response to negative partnership survey item for
nonprofit organizations
Likert scale response to negative partnership survey item for
private organizations
Annual median AQI (EPA 2018a)
Rate of per capita spending per adjusted air quality index
point; calculated as (100-AQI)/spending per capita
Ratio of median household income in the 20th percentile to
the 80th percentile (US Census Bureau, 2018)
Portion of metropolitan area population under agency
jurisdiction (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018)
Ordinal dummy variable comparing Dillon’s Rule, modified
Dillon’s Rule, and Home Rule states
Dummy variable comparing regional agencies with
city/county agencies

2.49

1.13

1

5

2.37

1.04

1

5

50.71
30.64

13.05
58.86

24
.67

97
410.53

5.55

.46

4.20

6.93

.63

.34

.01

1.00

1.17

.66

0

2

.38

.49

0

1
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